

THE NEW STRATEGIC OUTLOOK IN THE PACIFIC

Kenneth G. Weiss



A Division of Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

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Work conducted under contract N00014-83-C-0725.

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CRM 85-107 / October 1985

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			Approved for Public Release. Distribution Unlimited.		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) CRM 85-107			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for Naval Analyses		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) CNA		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06)	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20350-2000		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / ORGANIZATION Office of Naval Research		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ONR		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER N00014-83-C-0725	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 800 North Quincy Street Arlington, Virginia 22217			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65154N	PROJECT NO. R0148	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) The New Strategic Outlook in the Pacific					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Kenneth G. Weiss					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) October 1985	
				15. PAGE COUNT 30	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This research memorandum discusses the strategic outlook in the Pacific. In doing so, it looks at the Asia-Pacific region in historical perspective, examines the area's role in deterrence and a global conflict, and touches on current problems in the region.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

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
29 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 85-107

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 85-107, "The New Strategic Outlook in the Pacific," by Kenneth G. Weiss, October 1985

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Memorandum discusses the strategic outlook in the Pacific. In doing so, it looks at the Asia-Pacific region in historical perspective, examines the area's role in deterrence and a global conflict, and touches on current problems in the region. The paper argues that the political, economic, and military prospects for the region are generally bright. Moreover, the Pacific holds great promise for strengthening the West in both peace and war. But to realize the full promise of these prospects, the U.S. must put a greater premium on achieving cooperation with friends and allies there, than it has in the past.



Bradford Dismukes
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ABSTRACT

This research memorandum discusses the strategic outlook in the Pacific. In doing so, it looks at the Asia-Pacific region in historical perspective, examines the area's role in deterrence and a global conflict, and touches on current problems in the region.

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INTRODUCTION*

The strategic outlook in the Pacific is a subject of considerable interest. The prospects for the region itself--politically, economically, and militarily--are generally bright. Moreover, the Pacific holds great promise for strengthening the West in both peace and war. However, wherever great opportunities exist, great dangers also lurk. So this research memorandum will take a closer look at the Asian-Pacific region's role in deterrence and in a global conflict.

Before looking at that role, the paper will first describe how the current situation in the Pacific region came about. It will end by touching on current problems in the region. This discussion is meant to be provocative rather than definitive, to stimulate further research rather than to present a settled opinion.

* This research memorandum was originally presented at the U.S.-French bilateral talks at the U.S. National Defense University on 7 May 1985.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

Enthusiasm regarding the outlook in the Pacific has become almost commonplace. For example, speaker after speaker at a recent conference in Hawaii sponsored by the National Defense University alluded to the dynamic economic growth and political stability enjoyed by U.S. friends and allies in the region.¹ In contrast, the Soviet Union and its few friends in the area were often described as economically stagnant and politically isolated, even if militarily powerful. The current situation was compared with the one prevailing 10 years ago when the fall of South Vietnam seemed to mark a retreat by the United States from Asia. However, the dynamics of this dramatic turnabout were rarely described. At the risk of seeming simplistic, it is worthwhile to describe briefly the evolution of the current situation, because it will help illuminate the problems and opportunities the Pacific region presents for global stability.

U.S. POLICY

For much of the period since World War II, the Asian-Pacific region has been a source of concern for the U.S. in particular and the West in general. In the face of Soviet hostility after the war, the U.S. adopted a policy of containment to prevent Soviet domination of the Eurasian continent and protect the sea lanes for the free flow of trade, capital, and resources. The triumph of a Soviet-backed government in China in 1949 and Soviet (and later Chinese) support for North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950 seemed to represent a political and military challenge to Washington's willingness to oppose Moscow's domination--not just in Asia but also in Europe. In fact, the Korean War had a fundamental effect on U.S. policy in both Europe and Asia. It helped transform NATO from a "guarantee pact" to a more fully, if not wholly, integrated military and political alliance.² It also helped transform Japan from a defeated enemy to a U.S. ally, lay the basis for U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea, inspire the ANZUS treaty alliance, and involve the U.S. in opposing Chinese enmity, especially in the Taiwan Straits and Southeast Asia.

Arguably, the U.S. policy of containing China provided, in part, the basis for an eventual rapprochement between the two powers.³ Disagreements between China and the Soviet Union over policy toward the U.S. and its Asian friends and allies helped sour their relationship. For example, the Chinese resented Moscow's demand that Beijing repay the Soviet Union for its military aid to China in the Korean War.⁴ Moreover, Washington's success in thwarting Beijing's objectives in the Taiwan Straits in 1958 helped make China's leaders dissatisfied with the extent of Soviet support in the crisis.⁵ This failure of Soviet foreign policy as well as alleged Soviet interference in China's internal affairs pursuant to the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s helped precipitate their ideological dispute in the early 1960s.⁶ Furthermore,

a dispute over how best to oppose U.S. "imperialism" in Indochina in 1965 led to a series of events--a power struggle in Beijing, the Cultural Revolution, and the Soviet military buildup--that transformed the Sino-Soviet war of words into outright confrontation 4 years later.⁷ Soviet hostility in the Ussuri crisis of 1969 forced China's leaders to move toward rapprochement with the U.S. and eventually to reconsider their support for Hanoi.⁸ (The U.S. viewed the Sino-Soviet crisis as an opportunity to obtain the support of both powers for a settlement in Indochina, which was eventually completed in early 1973.)⁹

Moreover, the policy of containment had given U.S. friends and allies in the region time to develop their economies and establish more stable governments. U.S. presence in the Far East had fostered the conditions for the Japanese economic boom in the 1960s--a boom that eventually spread to other non-Communist countries in the region. Furthermore, non-Communist countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were able to create more or less stable governments in the face of various insurrections and rebellions since World War II.¹⁰

Although Washington lost the political, if not the military, struggle in Indochina with the fall of Saigon in 1975, the U.S. won the peace.* China increasingly saw its interests in parallel with those of the West in opposing Soviet hegemonism. Most Asian nations, including China, were beginning to see the advantages of the Western economic model over a Soviet one. Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN nations were starting to realize the need to provide more fully for their own defense as well as cooperate with the U.S. to oppose the Soviets and their surrogates in the region.¹¹

SOVIET BUILDUP

Although U.S. policy has been successful in fostering the conditions for the emergence of more independent, self-confident nations in the region as barriers to Soviet expansionism, Moscow has not stood still. The Kremlin has sought to compensate for its political and economic failures in the region by building up its military capabilities in the Far East. While U.S. strength in the Pacific declined with the end of the Vietnam War, Soviet forces in the Far East increased from about 22 divisions in 1965 to 53 divisions today, from fewer than 1,500 combat aircraft to more than 2,000, and from fewer than 600 warships to more than 800.¹² The Soviets have also modernized their forces in the region to include SS-20 missiles, Backfire bombers, and Kiev-class carriers.¹³ Moreover, the Soviets have established a substantial military presence in Southeast Asia athwart the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

* This is not to argue that U.S. policy in that war was a wise one, but rather to point out that U.S. involvement there had some benefits as well as undeniable costs.

THE PACIFIC THEATER IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE

The growth of Soviet military power and the relative decline of U.S. strength since the late 1960s have made the Asian-Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, more important to the U.S. and NATO in containing and deterring the Soviet Union. This section looks at the roles of Japan and China--the key nations of the region--in containing Soviet hegemonism in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region. It then looks at the Pacific theater's role in deterring a nuclear or conventional attack on the West.

ROLES OF CHINA AND JAPAN IN CONTAINING SOVIET HEGEMONISM

The role of China and Japan in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area is more indirect than direct. Developments in the Pacific region promise to give the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) greater flexibility in responding to contingencies in the Indian Ocean area.

Both China and Japan have worried that the Soviets were trying to gain control of the sea lanes to the Persian Gulf and drive the U.S. out of Europe and Asia. As the current Defense of Japan puts it:

Moreover, backed by its military buildup, the Soviet Union is trying to expand its influence to the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and elsewhere....

The area of the Middle East and Indian Ocean covers the great oil producing fields with nearly 50 percent of the world's oil deposits and export potential as well as several important maritime traffic routes, including oil transport routes. For this reason, it is essential to the survival and security of Japan and other free nations as well as the Third World countries to maintain peace and security in these strategically important areas and secure the maritime traffic routes.¹⁴

The Chinese Communist Party paper Hongqi echoed these sentiments even more explicitly in 1982:

[The geographical situation of the USSR] makes it imperative for the Soviet hegemonists to establish for themselves a "bow-shaped navigation" line in the east that links the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Southwest Pacific, the Sea of Japan, the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, if the Soviet Navy wants to enter the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to scramble for supremacy with the United States. The establishment and control of this navigation line will not only link their Black Sea Fleet with their Pacific Fleet and enable them to support one another, but will also enable the Soviet hegemonists to close up the channel through which the U.S. Pacific Fleet enters the Indian Ocean, reduce the strength of the United States in the Far East, and threaten China from the seas.¹⁵ (Emphasis added.)

As a result, both China and Japan have approved of U.S. efforts to improve PACOM's military capabilities.¹⁶ (And both countries recognize that U.S. forces might be maldeployed in the event of global conflict growing out of a Persian Gulf crisis.)¹⁷

Moreover, Beijing and Tokyo have adopted more assertive strategies to counter Soviet designs. For example, Chinese policy in Southeast Asia is based, in part, on Beijing's opposition to a Soviet presence in Indochina, which China believes is a key element in Moscow's plan to dominate the Eurasian SLOCs. Thus, China is pressuring Vietnam in the north while supporting Thailand against Vietnam and those Khmers resisting Soviet-supported Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. The Chinese are also supporting Pakistan and the Afghan guerrillas resisting Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Finally, the Chinese are improving their overall military capabilities, and Chinese naval deployments are designed, in part, to counter the Soviet presence in the China seas.¹⁸

The Japanese, in turn, have promised to acquire the wherewithal to protect Japan's SLOCs for 1,000 miles out, to close the straits to the Soviets in wartime, and to control Japan's airspace.¹⁹ Furthermore, in May 1981, Tokyo announced that Japan would target its development assistance "to areas important for maintaining peace and stability"--countries like Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and the newly independent countries of the South Pacific region.²⁰ Moreover, Tokyo pledged \$4 billion in economic aid to the Republic of Korea in early 1983.²¹ Such aid helps offset the heavy economic burden Seoul has undertaken in a military buildup designed, as President Chun says, "to guarantee victory" in the event of a North Korean attack.²² South Korea is now spending more on military preparedness than the North.²³ In addition, Chinese policy opposes a North Korean attack on the South, and apparently looks forward to better relations between Beijing and Seoul.²⁴ By the 1990s, South Korea could become the dominant power on

the peninsula. Furthermore, the ASEAN nations are making greater efforts to cooperate with each other and nations outside Southeast Asia to improve the area's security. For example, some ten land, sea, and air exercises were held by the ASEAN states with each other and the U.S., Britain, and Australia in 1983.²⁵

Obviously, many elements of weakness remain regarding the military preparedness of U.S. friends and allies in the region, but the trends are favorable--with the notable exception of developments in the ANZUS alliance. Moreover, the U.S. is continuing its efforts to improve its military position in the region. To the extent that security has been strengthened in the area, the U.S. has greater flexibility in deploying PACOM assets in response to contingencies in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.

ROLE OF THE PACIFIC THEATER IN DETERRING NATO-WARSAW PACT CONFLICT

The Pacific theater plays an important role in deterring a nuclear or conventional conflict. Indeed, Moscow's concern regarding its eastern flank may be a key consideration in deterring a Soviet attack on the West. Over the past few years, the strength of PACOM forces and the quality of the U.S.'s relationship with China have become more important in deterring a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Conflict

Until recently, the U.S. enjoyed a superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry. However, by the late 1970s, the Soviets had surpassed the U.S. in numbers of strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear weapons.²⁶ As a result, the U.S. has sought to strengthen deterrence by improving its nuclear capabilities,²⁷ developing the Peacekeeper or MX missile to help compensate for the Soviet counterforce weapons, SS-18s and SS-19s. Moreover, the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons, Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), in Europe where they could strike Soviet territory, has put the Kremlin on notice that a nuclear war begun in Europe would also involve the homelands of the superpowers. In the Pacific, U.S. Trident SSBNs and various cruise-missile platforms also contribute to nuclear deterrence. And even if the Soviets thought a victory were possible in a nuclear conflict with the West, Moscow apparently fears that an all-out nuclear war with the U.S. would leave the Soviet Union so devastated that the country would become easy prey for the Chinese.²⁸

Conventional Conflict

The Asian-Pacific region also has a role in helping deter a Soviet conventional attack in the West. The U.S. and its NATO allies have relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack. In a crisis, the Soviets might feel that their substantial nuclear

capabilities largely neutralized those of the West. Moreover, the political controversies in the West that were sparked by efforts to match Soviet capabilities in intermediate-range nuclear weapons and counterforce strategic weapons might also mislead the Kremlin into believing that NATO might not resort to nuclear weapons in case of a conventional attack. In any case, as Soviet scholar James McConnell points out, Soviet military writings have emphasized a NATO-Warsaw Pact war fought entirely at the conventional level.²⁹ Therefore, the U.S. and NATO must continue their efforts to improve their conventional capabilities to convince Moscow that even a conventional-style war would involve unacceptable risks. China, Japan, and the U.S. Pacific Command contribute to this effort by tying down a significant proportion of Soviet forces in East Asia.³⁰ (Indeed, if the Soviets were able to draw on their forces in the East, as they did in World War II, they could more than counter NATO's available reinforcements.)³¹

Of course, Chinese and Japanese help in this regard requires a sense of common interests with the U.S. and NATO in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Fortunately, both countries seem to see their interests linked with the West in such a struggle. The reason is simple: China and Japan know the consequences they would face should the USSR defeat NATO. As one Chinese analyst put it, "China is not and will not be an ally of the United States.... Being an ally does not necessarily make one a resolute and trustworthy partner. On the contrary, a partner within an antihegemonic United Front may contribute more than some allies. In the worst case, when the Soviet Union succeeds in edging the U.S. out of the Eastern hemisphere, the People's Republic of China will definitely be the last on the old continent to fall."³² A Chinese military officer in Washington said recently, "when war comes, we will be with you."³³

The Japanese also realize that their security is bound up with Western Europe. As Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone put it in an interview with Le Monde:

In addition, the fact that Japan is trying to improve its defense forces while respecting the Constitution and remaining faithful to its fundamental defense policy has, I think, positive effects, on the maintenance and strengthening of confidence in Japanese-American security agreements. Consequently, this contributes to the Western nations' security of Asia and, consequently of the whole world....

I am convinced that the maintenance of firm solidarity among the three poles--Japan, the United States, and Europe--is now the most important element of world peace and prosperity. I would like to pursue a diplomacy and world policy based on these three poles.³⁴

China and Japan may have a more subtle, perhaps even more important, deterrent effect on the Kremlin vis-a-vis a conventional war than just the number of Soviet troops they can tie down in the Far Eastern theater. A Soviet invasion of Western Europe would probably spur the Chinese and Japanese to improve their military capabilities whatever the outcome on the Western Front, whether or not they were directly involved.³⁵ China and Japan encouraged by the U.S. presence and support in the region have the requisite manpower, technology, and industry together with the U.S. to present a formidable challenge to the Soviet Union in a NATO-Pact or post-NATO-Pact conflict.³⁶ So what does it profit Moscow to gain a war-torn Western Europe only to create the Asian century?*

In any case, the prospect of a two-front war is a concern for the Soviets. As a result, Moscow is considering the problems involved in fighting a two-front war, in which one front clearly involves Asia.

* This paper explores possible Soviet attitudes toward deterrence and conventional war. It does not mean to imply that NATO need not or should not resort to nuclear weapons at some point in a Soviet attack.

THE PACIFIC THEATER IN A GLOBAL CONFLICT

As discussed in the previous section, the Pacific theater would be a key region in a war with the Soviet Union, wherever it began and at whatever level it were fought. This section looks at what Soviet strategy might be in the region. It also looks at what the U.S. might do to counter that strategy and how developments in the Pacific might have an effect on the war elsewhere, especially in Europe.

POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

As mentioned earlier, the Kremlin seems to prefer a conventional conflict to a nuclear one. In 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pledged that Moscow would not be the first to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. As previously stated, Soviet military writings emphasize the problems involved in waging a conventional struggle. Soviet writings also make clear that the eastern flank presents considerable problems for Moscow, particularly in a conventional conflict.³⁷

The Soviets then will try to defeat their opponents, in turn, aiming the decisive blow against the principal enemy (presumably NATO). Moscow is ever mindful of the Soviet experience in World War II. In that struggle, the Soviets were able to fight the Germans while the Eastern Front remained quiet. After Germany was defeated, the Soviets shifted their forces to the east and crushed the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1945.³⁸ Presumably, the Soviets would also like a peaceful eastern front while waging war with NATO. (Meanwhile, the Chinese have limited offensive capabilities and may be able to occupy more Soviet troops than if attacked, presuming they were inclined to do so early in the war. Moreover, Japan is also militarily weak and would be able to do little more than perform defensive operations in the early stages of the struggle.)

As indicated earlier, such a strategy would present a problem for Moscow in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. During World War II, Japan was fully occupied with its struggles with the U.S. and China. Not only was Japan reluctant to take on an additional opponent like the Soviet Union, but also Tokyo's strength was being drained in the course of the war in the Pacific.³⁹

Even so, the Soviets had to maintain substantial forces on the Eastern Front during the war because they could not be certain that Japan would not decide to attack at some point.⁴⁰ But in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, China, Japan, and other Asian nations, whether or not they joined the struggle early on, would shift to a war footing, if only for defensive purposes.⁴¹ The Soviets are, of course, mindful of Chinese advantages in manpower--a problem with which they have never had

to deal with before.⁴² They also have considerable respect for Tokyo's capacity for transforming Japan's industrial and technological capabilities into military power.⁴³ (Indeed, Moscow seems to view the Japanese industrial base as an extension of the U.S. one.)⁴⁴ So not only would the Soviets have to maintain substantial forces on the Eastern Front as they did in World War II, but the threat on that flank would increase as the Asian nations build up their military strength.⁴⁵ As mentioned earlier, those nations in cooperation with the U.S. have the necessary manpower, industrial base, and military-technological expertise to defeat the Soviet Union in a conventional conflict whatever the outcome in Europe.

So if the Soviets wanted to wage a conventional conflict how could they deal with this problem without initiating a two-front war?* As Sun Tzu points out, the best way to defeat an enemy is to attack his strategy.⁴⁸ And, if that is not possible, then his alliances must be disrupted. Presumably, the Soviets would try to do both. The U.S. is, of course, the "glue" in any Pacific coalition.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Soviets could try to put U.S. PACOM forces on the defensive as far east as possible and try to cut the SLOCs to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. They would also try to protect their SSBNs in the bastion formed by the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk while trying to pursue an anti-SSBN campaign against the U.S. With the U.S. isolated in the Pacific, Moscow might be able to deal with its potential enemies in the region on a piecemeal basis after securing objectives in Europe. The Soviets could do so through intimidation or a judicious application of military power. Moreover, the Kremlin would probably seek to disrupt any Pacific alliance by securing nonaggression pacts, by holding out the threat of retaliation, and by pointing to the inevitable defeat of the U.S.

Some evidence indicates that the Soviets are thinking along these lines. For example, Soviet military writings have put more emphasis on the importance of anti-SLOC and anti-SSBN campaigns in a conventional conflict.⁵⁰ They are also acquiring more SSNs for anti-SSBN and anti-SLOC roles.⁵¹ They also have greater long-range capabilities in the Pacific than in the past. In regard to threats: in the Ussuri Crisis of 1969, the Kremlin claimed that a Sino-Soviet conflict would benefit only the West.⁵² When Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone indicated that Japan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," the Soviets threatened to make it a nuclear wreck.⁵³

*If the Soviets initiated a two-front war, they might be able to exploit their military advantages vis-a-vis the U.S., NATO, China, and Japan. But they would also help the U.S. forge an alliance that would practically guarantee a protracted struggle. As Sun Tzu points out, "when the army engages in a protracted campaign the resources of the state will not suffice."⁴⁶ Moreover, preparations for a two-front campaign would have to be extensive; this could lengthen the warning time and diminish the element of surprise--a key consideration in Soviet strategy.⁴⁷

POTENTIAL U.S. STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Thus, the U.S. strategy in the Pacific must be the reverse of the Soviet one. It must seek to form at least a loose coalition with the Asian-Pacific nations, especially Japan and China. Success in this regard would enhance NATO's threat to resort to nuclear weapons in the conventional phase. Countering Soviet policy in Asia might help convince Moscow that a return to the status quo ante would be preferable to a conventional conflict that might only lead to an unwinnable war in Asia or to a nuclear conflict that will leave a devastated Soviet Union vulnerable to the Chinese and other Asians. This shift in the balance against Moscow would occur whether or not the struggle spread early on to Asia and whether the struggle were nuclear or conventional.

Thus, U.S. military forces in the Pacific would be best employed in convincing Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing that the U.S. has staying power in the region, whether or not the war goes nuclear. PACOM forces, then, especially naval ones, should engage in sequential operations designed to eliminate Soviet naval forces and facilities in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea; to keep open the SLOCs to East Asia and the Indian Ocean by bottling up Soviet naval/nuclear forces in the Northwest Pacific and by protecting merchant shipping from Soviet submarine and air attack; and to preserve the U.S. SSBN force in the Pacific from attrition. By the U.S. establishing itself as the dominant force in the Pacific theater, the Chinese would be more likely to take a hostile stance towards the Soviets along the border, restrain the North Koreans from attacking South Korea, pressure the Vietnamese in Southeast Asia, maintain a nonaggressive posture toward Taiwan, and perhaps help protect the SLOCs in the China seas.

In turn, the Japanese would be more likely to support U.S. operations by allowing continued U.S. access to bases in Japan and to undertake defensive measures in protection of their own airspace, their strategic straits and SLOCs for 1,000 miles out, and, of course, their own territorial integrity. (As discussed earlier, should the conflict break out in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region, U.S. forces would be, in effect, engaged in protecting interests of stated importance to both Japan and China. Therefore, their support should also be forthcoming in that situation as well.)

PACOM strategy in the Asian-Pacific region could strengthen the West in the conventional phase of the war and perhaps help persuade the Soviets to return to the status quo ante. Moreover, improved U.S. nuclear capabilities in the region with the deployment of the cruise missiles aboard naval ships (TLAM/N) may help persuade the Soviets that nuclear war in Europe would involve Asia and, likewise, a nuclear war in Asia would involve Europe.⁵⁴ Furthermore, should the West fair rather well in a conventional struggle in Europe and halt the Soviet advance at the Rhine, for example, NATO might be able to draw on the productive capacity of Asia to provide the wherewithal to break the

stalemate eventually and drive the Soviets back to Eastern Europe without using nuclear weapons. In this case, the Soviets might be willing to seek a negotiated settlement because the alternative would be nuclear war or defeat.

CURRENT PROBLEMS

The growing weight of the Asian-Pacific region in the strategic balance presents a dilemma for the U.S. and other Western countries. As we have seen, Japan, China, and other nations in the area have an important role to play in containing, deterring, and perhaps defeating Soviet hegemonism. However, the very importance of these Asian nations puts a premium on successfully managing and fostering U.S. relations with them. This section discusses some of the political, military, and economic problems that make efforts at cooperation a full-time job.

U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

The U.S. should strengthen its relations with Japan and China--the key nations in the region--so Moscow will hesitate to doubt their support for the U.S. and the West in a conflict. This is easy to say but difficult to carry out.

For example, the U.S. should encourage the Japanese to finance the military capabilities necessary to fulfill their stated objectives of defending their territorial integrity, airspace, and strategic straits and SLOCs for 1,000 miles out. Yet, the U.S. should do so without generating political problems on either side that would disrupt the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Moreover, the U.S. should be mindful of the concern of other Asian nations regarding the prospect of Japan as a military power.

In regard to China, the U.S. and other Western nations should help the Chinese modernize their military forces.⁵⁵ Otherwise China may fall even further behind the Soviet Union in military capabilities--rather than catch up with it. Because of this help, China's military will acquire a greater stake in relations with the U.S., strengthening overall Sino-Western ties. However, in helping the Chinese, the U.S. should not overlook other interests such as the security of Taiwan, the fear of Southeast Asian nations (e.g., Indonesia and Malaysia) regarding Chinese expansionism, and the need to avoid provoking the Soviets into a preemptive attack. Moreover, the U.S. should also be sensitive to China's concern about avoiding a subordinate relationship like the one Beijing had with Moscow in the 1950s. So the U.S. should go slowly, keep a low profile, and leave open its options in developing a military relationship with the Chinese.

U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION

The spectacular economic growth of the Asian-Pacific region in the 1970s and 1980s is responsible for much of the optimism regarding that region. Thus, the U.S. should find a way of managing its economic problems in the region while avoiding protectionism, barriers to capital movements, and excessive controls on technology transfer. If the U.S.

fails in this, it could do serious damage to the growing ties with other countries of the region, thereby damaging the overall security of the area and the Western world.

The U.S. should continue its efforts to promote security on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. should help the Republic of Korea promote detente with the North by enlisting the cooperation of China, Japan, and perhaps the Soviet Union. Washington should continue to encourage the South Koreans to improve their ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat a North Korean attack.⁵⁶ Moreover, the U.S. should discreetly encourage military cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Such cooperation is necessary for Tokyo to close the Tsushima Strait between Japan and South Korea to the Soviets in wartime.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the availability of Japanese military support for Seoul in a Korean conflict would give the U.S. greater flexibility in responding to contingencies elsewhere. Unfortunately, historical animosity between the two countries makes it difficult to promote such cooperation, so the U.S. must move slowly in this matter.

The U.S. should continue its efforts to promote political, economic, and military reforms in the Philippines without undermining Manila's ability to deal with the growing Communist insurrection in the country and without becoming excessively involved in that struggle as it did in Vietnam. A hostile government in Manila would not only pose a threat to U.S. access to Subic/Clark bases--a key component in the U.S.' ability to maintain security in the region--but would also represent a threat to the stability of ASEAN.⁵⁸ (Of course, Corazon Aquino's assumption of the presidency represents a significant step forward in the Philippines. But euphoria over the change in leadership in Manila should not obscure the pressing political, economic, and military problems the new regime faces.)

The U.S. should continue to support Bangkok and the other ASEAN capitals in seeking an end to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Moreover, Washington should continue to help Thailand and the other ASEAN states to improve their security in the face of the Vietnamese-Khmer conflict that has often spilled over the Thai border.

Finally, the U.S. needs to prevent New Zealand's decision to bar visits by nuclear-capable ships from becoming a precedent. New Zealand's action threatens U.S. security relations with Japan, Australia, the newly independent Pacific island nations, and even China. Moreover, it may also spread the nuclear allergy in NATO and the U.S. just when the U.S. has succeeded in deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and obtaining further funding for the MX.

CONCLUSION

Developments in the Asian-Pacific region are favorable for global security and stability. But to realize the full promise of these developments, the U.S. must put a greater premium on achieving cooperation with its friends and allies in the region. Thus, there are great opportunities as well as great dangers in the area. The U.S. must find a way to realize those opportunities while avoiding the dangers.

NOTES

1. Pacific Symposium on the "Regional Balance of Power in the Asian-Pacific Region," sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-22 February 1985.
2. See Robert E. Osgood, ***NATO, The Entangling Alliance*** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) for an excellent account of the origins of NATO.
3. The strain in the relations between the Soviet Union and China was recognized early on. In the 1950s, then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued: "the best hope for intensifying the strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia would be to keep the Chinese under maximum pressure...Tito did not break with Stalin because we were nice to Tito. On the contrary, we were very rough with Tito." Cited in John Lewis Gaddis, ***Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 142-143.
4. Ding Xinghao of the Institute of International Relations in Shanghai in a presentation on "Chinese Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia," at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1985.
5. A. Doak Barnett, ***China and the Major Powers in East Asia*** (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 25-46.
6. *Ibid.*
7. David and Nancy Dall Milton, ***The Wind Will Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China--1964-1969*** (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 80-108. See also Barnett, ***China and the Major Powers***, 48.
8. For an account of the Ussuri crisis of 1969, see Kenneth G. Weiss, "Power Grows Out of a Barrel of a Gunboat: The U.S. in Sino-Soviet Crises," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 376 (December 1982).
9. For U.S. strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, see Henry A. Kissinger, ***White House Years*** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979; Richard M. Nixon, ***RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*** (2 vols; New York: Warner Books, 1978).
10. In the wake of the Chinese Communist Party's success in China, the U.S. was very concerned in the late forties about the impact the "loss" of Indochina would have on the political, economic, and psychological prospects for pro-Western regimes in Southeast Asia,

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- Japan, and India. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the 'Defensive Perimeter' Concept, 1947-1951," in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (eds.), *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations 1947-1950* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1980), 61-118. Although Indochina was indeed "lost" in 1975, time had been gained for the establishment of more or less stable and prosperous pro-Western regimes in Southeast Asia (with the notable exception of the Philippines), Japan, South Korea, India, and even China itself. Indeed, the continuing importance of U.S. presence in fostering stability in the region was noted by Asian, Pacific, and U.S. speaker alike at the Pacific Symposium on the "Regional Balance of Power in the Asian-Pacific Region," sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-22 February 1985.
11. This is a conclusion implicit in the papers and presentations at the Pacific Symposium on the "Regional Balance of Power in the Asian-Pacific Region," sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-22 February 1985.
 12. *Defense of Japan, 1984* (Tokyo, Japan: Defense Agency, 1984), pp. 30-34.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
 15. Beijing, *Hongqi*, 1 February 1982, *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report, China*, 18 February 1982, C1. Hereafter cited as *FBIS: China*. See also *Beijing Review*, 23 April 1984, *FBIS: China*, 2 May 1984, A6-A7 for additional evidence regarding China's view of SLOCs.
 16. For Japan, see *Defense of Japan, 1984*, 39-40; for China, see Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Sea is Red: The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Its Naval Dimension," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 421 (May 1984), 31-34.
 17. In a speech at the Pacific Symposium on "Pacific Basin Security: Economic Dimension" sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 13-14 February 1986, Matsunaga Noburu, Japan's Ambassador to the United States said that a greater capability on the part of Japan to defend itself will "help the U.S. to respond to crises in Southwest Asia or the Indian Ocean." Recognition of the possible maldeployment of U.S. forces is also implicit in Hua Di, "The Soviet Threat to the Northern Pacific Region from an Overall Point of View,"

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presentation to the Pacific Symposium on "Regional Balance of Power in the Pacific Basin," sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-22 February 1985.

18. Weiss, "The Sea is Red;" *Asian Security, 1983* (Tokyo, Japan: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1983), 16, 203; *South China Morning Post* (27 November 1985): Features-1.
19. See the interview with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Washington Post*, (19 January 1983), A12.
20. *Asian Security, 1984* (Tokyo, Japan: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1984), 192. See also "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy," *Japan Economic Institute Report* No. 44A, 15 November 1985.
21. *Asian Security, 1984*, 180.
22. *Ibid.*, 121.
23. *Ibid.*, 122.
24. In 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang told the Japanese that China supported the "peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula," and indicated that North Korea had "no intention of advancing to the South," Tokyo, *Asahi Shimbun*, (27 September 1982).
25. *Asian Security, 1984*, 169-171.
26. For an account of Soviet nuclear posture and the U.S. response, see *Soviet Military Power 1985* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985) 24-41.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Soviet and Chinese Strategic Perceptions in Peacetime and Wartime," Defense Nuclear Agency, DNA-TR-81-262, 31 October 1982.
29. James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis From Nuclear to Conventional: The Long-Term Perspective," Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 490, Vol. I, June 1983; James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis From Nuclear to Conventional: The Mid-Term Perspective," Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 490, Vol. II, June 1983.
30. For Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific region see *Defense of Japan 1984; Soviet Military Power, 1985*.

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31. Soviet troops, planes, and tanks withdrawn from the Soviet Far East saved Moscow in December, 1940. When the Soviets learned in September 1940 that the Japanese would not attack before the spring of 1942 at the earliest, Stalin assembled some 24 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division and ten tank formations. (Including some 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft withdrawn in October and November alone) for the defense of Moscow. However, the Soviets could never be sure that the Japanese would not attack so Soviet forces were rebuilt in the Far East and the Japanese continued to tie down approximately 750,000 troops (at roughly pre-war levels) throughout the war. John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 237-240, 271-272.
32. Hua Di, Senior Researcher, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, the Peoples Republic of China, "Chinese Comprehensive Strategic Doctrine" unpublished, undated conference paper (circa 1982). See also Hua Di, "The Soviet Threat to the Northern Pacific Region From an Overall Point of View," presented at the symposium on "Regional Balance of Power in the Pacific Basin" sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University, Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-22 February, 1985.
33. This remark was made to and cited by Dr. Ronald Montaperto, Defense Intelligence Agency, in a presentation on "The PLA in the Era of Reform" at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1984.
34. Paris, *Le Monde*, 7 Jun 1984, *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report, Asia Pacific*, 12 June 1984, C1-C4.
35. In regard to a military buildup in a crisis, the Japanese are already promoting a certain amount of self-sufficiency in their military industrial base through emphasis on the research, development, and production of their own equipment. See *Defense of Japan 1984*, pp. 68, 148. See also "Japanese Defense: Out of the Closet," *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 19A, 17 May 1985. The Chinese, in turn, are emphasizing economic modernization over defense modernization because they believe the danger of "hegemonic" war has declined, but they have indicated that priorities would be reversed if a global war broke out. Moreover, they also seem to indicate that they do not believe China could avoid some involvement in such a struggle. As Huan Xiang puts it: "...Today both the United States and the Soviet Union correspondingly are stepping up their deployment of actual combat weapons in every theater. For the Soviet Union, fighting in the European theater and the Asian and Pacific theater in the past meant fighting on two fronts; for the United States, fighting

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in the Atlantic and in the Pacific also meant fighting on two fronts. Today, fighting on two fronts has gradually become one unified scheme of action. This means to say that while fighting in Europe, war will be going on in Asia, and vice versa. And the deployment of their commands is developing in this direction...On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union have made continuous contacts...Therefore, the chance of an outbreak of war is not great...Based on the above analysis, it is estimated that the international diplomatic and strategic patterns formed at present will not undergo great changes by the end of this century, but, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility of small changes. In war and peace, we should base our work on preparations for an outbreak of war. Therefore, we must strive to modernize our Army and exert our efforts to win time to build a powerful industrial foundation in our economy so as to make our economic work in the future really capable of raising the living standard of the people in peacetime and of shifting to the track of war immediately in wartime." Shanghai, *Shijie Jingji Daobao* 9 July 1984, *FBIS: China*, 26 July 1984, K10-K11.

36. As the *Defense of Japan 1984* indicates U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation is increasing at all levels including the technological one. Indeed, Japan has agreed to facilitate the transfer of Japanese technology suitable for military purposes to the U.S. See *Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Industry-to-Industry International Armaments Cooperation Phase II--Japan* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, June 1984). As for the possibility of Sino-U.S. military, including naval cooperation, see Kenneth G. Weiss, "Dragon at Sea: China's Navy in Strategy and Diplomacy," Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 86-2, December 1985.
37. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis From Nuclear to Conventional." See also Garrett and Glaser, "Soviet Strategic Perceptions in Peacetime and Wartime." Moreover, the Soviets revealed their concern regarding the implications for a two-front war of the Sino-U.S. agreement to normalize relations in early December 1978 by re-establishing the Soviet Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (TVD) later that month or early 1979. The Far Eastern TVD was first established in 1945 to provide the command structure for the Soviet attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945. See Weiss, "The Sea is Red." Indeed, the Soviets took advantage of the 35th anniversary of the Manchurian campaign to reissue excerpts of the memoirs of the commander of the operation and to warn in the introduction:

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"Today, the imperialists are again fanning a campaign of slander about a 'Soviet threat' to bring back the days of the cold war, to revive international tensions. In this context, the lessons of the past are of special importance. They teach the peace-lovers to be vigilant, constantly to expose the schemes of imperialism and to foil them." See A. Vasilevsky, "Rout of the Kwantung Army," Supplement to *Soviet Military Review*, No. 8, 1980.

38. A. Vasilevsky, "Rout of the Kwantung Army." See also John Despres, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, "Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy," RAND Corp., R-1825-NA, July 1976. Lilita I. Dzirkals, "'Lightning War' in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign," RAND Corp., P-5589, January 1976.
39. Indeed, the Japanese originally planned to attack the Soviets after tidying up in Indochina in the summer of 1940--and built up their forces in northern China accordingly. But the U.S. cutoff of oil supplies on July 24 drew Tokyo's attention toward the Pacific. After Pearl Harbor, Japanese efforts to revive the "northern" expedition were foiled by the demands of war in Asia and the Pacific. Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 26-28.
40. Vasilevsky complains: "Even during the most difficult months on the Soviet-German front we were compelled to keep 30-40 divisions on the Far Eastern frontier. The Kwantung Army deployed in Manchuria and constantly spearheaded against the Soviet Far East doubled its strength in the summer of 1941. On 25 November 1941, Germany and its allies, including Japan, extended the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. On instructions from Tokyo the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 was being constantly violated. In December 1941 the Japanese opened artillery fire at our merchantman 'Simeropol' 'Sergei Lazo,' 'Svirstroy' and 'Krechets' and sank the 'Perekop' and 'Maikop'.

"The new version of the Japanese plan of military operations against the USSR, produced in Tokyo in 1942, provided for the annexation of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. However, the rout of the Hitler grouping at Stalingrad confused the plans not only of Berlin, but also of Tokyo.

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"Even while fighting against the U.S. forces, the Japanese retained two-thirds of their tanks, half of their artillery and the emperor's crack divisions in the Kwantung Army. And although the Soviet victories in 1943 and 1944 compelled the Japanese to forget about their commitments to Berlin about attacking the USSR, they continued to pursue an outspokenly anti-Soviet and aggressive foreign policy. By 1945 the number of Soviet merchantmen held up by the Japanese reached 178. Japanese diplomats in the USSR actively engaged in collecting espionage information. The Bacteriological Institute under the Kwantung Army (the so-called Manchurian Detachment No. 731) was preparing for massive use of the bacteriological weapon against the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic, and China." See also notes 30 and 38.

41. See note 34.
42. A study of Soviet elite attitudes notes that when asked about the Chinese, Soviets say, "there are too many of them, there is too much open land in Siberia to tempt them, and they are too industrious;" and "we do not have enough missiles to shoot one at every individual Chinese pouring over our border." Gregory Guroff and Steven Grant, "Soviet Elite's World View and Perceptions of the U.S.," Office of Research, U.S. International Communications Agency, 29 September 1981, 32.
43. For example, V.I. Bunin points out "Japan's mounting military budget is the major indicator of its increasing militarist tendencies....The diversion of one-third of Japan's military budget to the manufacture of arms is the second important indicator of Japan's increasing military preparations....Japan not only keeps up with, but even outstrips the NATO bloc in the quality and sometimes quantities of military hardware produced." V. I. Bunin "The Defeat of Japanese Militarism: Lessons and the Present Day, Moscow, *Far Eastern Affairs, USSR Report: Problems of the Far East*, Jul-Sep 1985, *Joint Publications Research Service*, 21 November 1985, 28-29. Hereafter *USSR: Far East: JPRS*.
44. *Ibid.*
45. See note 34.
46. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 73.
47. See Despres et al., "The Manchurian Model," 13-24; Dzirkals, "Lightning War," 28-30.

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48. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 77.
49. The Soviets implicitly acknowledge this when they complain: "Caspar Weinberger, the U.S. Defense Secretary, quite openly confirmed the Pentagon's ambitions in Asia, when he stated that U.S. policy in Asia 'may influence the global alignment of forces more essentially' than U.S. efforts in other regions of the world. In implementation of its plans in Asia, the White House counts not only on its 'traditional' allies (Japan, South Korea, and others), but also on China. During his recent visit to the PRC, President Reagan made it unequivocally clear that the USA is ready for a 'close partnership' with Peking on the basis of a 'community of interests.' Peking expressed solidarity with the U.S. military buildup in the region. In fact the aim is to attach China to the U.S. Asian policy, which is aimed at encircling the Soviet Union and other socialist countries from the Eastern flank. Editorial: "The Threat to Peace and Security in the Far East," Moscow, *Far Eastern Affairs*, Jan-Mar 85, *USSR Report: Far East: JPRS*, 5 June 1985, 2.
50. For the Soviet anti-SLOC threat, I am indebted to the observations of Charles C. Petersen. See also, Dean Wheatstine, "The Soviet Anti-SLOC Debate in Open Literature," Naval PostGraduate School Thesis, Mar 85. For the Soviet anti-SSBN threat, see James M. McConnell, "New Soviet Methods for Anti-Submarine Warfare?" *Naval War College Review* (July-August 1985), 16-27.
51. I am indebted to the observations of Robert G. Weinland concerning the purpose for current Soviet construction of SSNs. For an accounting of Soviet SSNs, see *Soviet Military Power 1985*.
52. See Weiss, "Power."
53. *Washington Post* (19 January 1983), A12; *Washington Post* (20 January 1983), A1.
54. *Defense of Japan, 1984*, 12.
55. For a discussion of this issue, see Kenneth G. Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."
56. For a discussion of this issue, see Edward A. Olsen, "Security in Northeast Asia: A Trilateral Alternative," *Naval War College Review*, (January-February 1985), 15-24.
57. *Asian Security 1984*, 124-125.

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58. For a discussion of the effect of events in the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asian region in 1979 on the Philippines, see Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Structure of Anarchy or Thinking About the Global Effects of Extreme Tension in Southwest Asia," Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper 419, April 1980.